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WORLD LAW
The purpose of this section of the Journal, included for the first
time in the present issue, is primarily to make available current infor-
mation regarding the judgments, important orders, and advisory opin-
ions of the World Court-now the United Nations International Court
of Justice. This tribunal, to all intents and purposes a continuation of
the Permanent Court of International Justice established in 1922 in
accordance with a provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
has contributed significantly to the settlement of international disputes
and to the development of law. It has, accordingly, a significant place
in the world community and the world legal order of today. Its pro-
nouncements, because of their association with the international peace
effort, are of importance for everyone. Because of increasing profes-
sional preoccupation with international matters, they are of ever-increas-
ing concern to the practicing lawyer. It is believed that, as a medium
for the diffusion of such information, the Journal can fulfill a real need.
In addition to the activities of the World Court, international legal
acts and decisions of other international tribunals and of national courts
relating to international law, especially those of the Supreme Court of
the United States, as well as other relevant acts of national govern-
ments, may be appropriately noted and reviewed in this section.
It seems especially appropriate to begin with a digest to date of the
Interhandel Case, one of the two issues* to which the United States has
been a party before the World Court.
-The Editors
THE INTERHANDEL CASE:
SWITZERLAND V. UNITED STATES1
THIS CASE was instituted October 2, 1957, when the Swiss Govern-
ment filed an application with the Registrar of the International Court
of Justice claiming restitution of assets of its national, Interhandel,
* The other one was the Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States
of America in Morocco (France v. United States), [195z] I.C.J. Rep. 176. The
Interhandel Case is still pending in United States federal courts and may become the
subject of further proceedings in the World Court. See also, case of the Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), [954] I.C.J. Rep. 19, in
which the United States was pro forma a defendant.
1[19s] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
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which had been vested in the United States during World War II
under claim that they were, in fact, enemy, not neutral, property. The
application invoked the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, under
article 36(2)2 of its Statute, which both Switzerland and the United
States had formally accepted. By order of October 24, 1957, the Court
denied as unnecessary a request by Switzerland for interim measures of
protection. The memorial of the plaintiff was filed in due course; the
defendant replied with preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of
the Court; whereupon proceedings on the merits were suspended under
article sixty-two of the Rules of the Court. Hearings on the prelimi-
nary objections of the United States were held in November 1958. In
the application and subsequent pleadings, and during the oral proceed-
ings, numerous submissions were presented by the Swiss Government.
Submissions accompanying its preliminary objections were re-affirmed
by the United States Government at the time of the oral proceedings,
which were concerned with the objections to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
After a brief historical review of the dispute, the Court, in its judg-
ment of March 21, 1959, disposed of a request by Switzerland for a
declaratory judgment on the ground that under article sixty-two of the
Rules, it was inadmissible at the present stage of the proceedings. It
noted that the Swiss submissions asked for judgment that the Govern-
ment of the United States was under obligation to restore the Inter-
handel assets or else to submit the dispute regarding them to arbitration
or conciliation under agreements to which both parties to the dispute
were parties. The Court then proceeded to consider the United States'
objections to its jurisdiction, four in number, one of them consisting of
two parts, choosing the order to suit the convenience of its presentation.
FIRST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The United States declaration of acceptance of the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction came into force on deposit with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, August 26, 1946; it contained a reservation
limiting its application to disputes thereafter arising. The United
States now contended
that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or determine the matters
raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial, for the reason that the dispute
arose before August 26th, 1946, the date on which the acceptance of the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction by this country became effective. (P. Io.)
2 The text of art. 36(2) is included in the United States declaration of acceptance,
quoted in this issue of the Journal, supra pp. 64-65.
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The basis of this contention lay in discussions in i945 and 1946 which
the Court found to have taken place within the framework of the
Washington Accord of May 25, i946. The Accord was concerned
chiefly with "enemy" assets in Switzerland. Asserting that "the facts
and situations which have led to a dispute must not be confused with
the dispute itself," the Court decided, after an examination of relevant
documents, that the claim of Switzerland for the return of the Inter-
handel assets in the United States was first formulated in its note of
May 4, 1948, to which the United States made its "final and con-
sidered" negative reply on July 26, 1948i and that the latter date,
accordingly, was the date when the dispute as such arose. This was
nearly two years subsequent to the United States declaration of accept-
ance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The United States pre-
liminary objection first dealt with was rejected.4
2 x4 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1121 (1946). This agreement, in the language of the
Court,
was concluded between the three Allied Powers and Switzerland (the Washington
Accord). Under one of the provisions of the Accord, Switzerland undertook to
pursue its investigations and to liquidate German property in Switzerland. It
was the Compensation Office which was "empowered to uncover, take into pos-
session, and liquidate German property" (Accord, Annex, II, A), in collaboration
with a Joint Commission "composed of representatives of each of the four
Governments" (Annex, 11, B). The Accord lays down the details of that col-
laboration (Annex, II, C, D, E, F) and provides that, in the event of disagree-
ment between the Joint Commission and the Compensation Office or if the party
in interest so desires, the matter may within a period of one month be submitted
to a Swiss Authority of Review composed of three members and presided over
by a Judge. "The decisions of the Compensation Office, or of the Authority of
Review, should the matter be referred to it, shall be final?' (Annex, III). In
the event, however, of disagreement with the Swiss Authority of Review on cer-
tain given matters, "the three Allied Governments may, within one month,
require the difference to be submitted to arbitration" (Annex, III).
The Washington Accord further provides:
Arlicle IV, paragraph r.
The Government of the United States will unblock Swiss assets in the United
States. The necessary procedure will be determined without delay.
Zricle VI.
In case differences of opinion arise with regard to the application or inter-
pretation of this Accord which cannot be settled in any other way, recourse shall
be had to arbitration."
'The judges stood 10-5 on this finding. The dissenting judges considered the dis-
pute to have been essentially over the status of Interhandel. These judges objected to
the Court's reliance on the submission of the parties as the basis for determination of
the dispute. In their view, the dispute arose prior to August z6, 1946, and the pre-
liminary objection of the United States ought to have been upheld.
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SECOND PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The United States further contended
that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or determine the matters
raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial, for the reason that the dispute
arose before July 28th, 1948, the date on which the acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction by this country became binding on this country as
regards Switzerland. (Pp. Io-x I.)
The declaration of acceptance of Switzerland, however, contained no
reservation regarding the date a dispute arising prior to which was
excluded. The argument set out in the United States preliminary
objections was quoted by the Court as follows:
The United States Declaration, which was effective August 26th, 1946,
contained the clause limiting the Court's jurisdiction to disputes "hereafter
arising," while no such qualifying clause is contained in the Swiss Declaration
which was effective July 28th, 1948. But the reciprocity principle . . .
requires that as between the United States and Switzerland the Court's
jurisdiction be limited to disputes arising after July 28th, 1948 .... Other-
wise, retroactive effect would be given to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court. (P. 23.)
To this, the Court replied:
Reciprocity enables the State which has made the wider acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the Court to rely upon the reservations to the acceptance laid
down by the other Party. There the effect of reciprocity ends. It cannot
justify a State, in this instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction
which the other Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own Declaration.
(P. 23.)"
The Court, accordingly, rejected the objection unanimously."
FOURTH PRELIMINARY OBJECTION7
The Court next considered the second part of the fourth objection,
in which the United States contended
'Cf. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9,
passim.
, The Court, in rendering this judgment, was composed of President Klaestad; Vice-
President Zafrulla Khan5 Judges Basdevant, Hackworth, Winiarski, Badawi, Armand-
Ugon, Kojevnikov, Lauterpacht, Moreno Quintana, Cordova, Koo, Spiropoulos, Spender;
Judge ad hoc Carry.
A further submission by Switzerland, relating to the asserted obligation of the
United States to agree to arbitration or conciliation was found not to have arisen until
1957. Infra note 12.




that. there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine any issues
raised by the Swiss Application or Memorial concerning the seizure and re-
tention of the vested shares of General Aniline and Film Corporation, for
the reason that such seizure and retention are, according to international law,
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. (P. i I.)
The Court noted that in challenging the seizure and retention by
the United States of Interhandel assets, the Swiss Government had
invoked both general international law and a specific international act.8
It then stated that it would not at the present stage of proceedings
undertake to assess the validity of the grounds upon which they had
been invoked by the Swiss Government, since that would be to enter
into the merits of the dispute: it sufficed to consider whether those
grounds were such as to justify the provisional conclusion that they
might be of relevance to the case and, if so, whether questions relating
to their validity and interpretation were questions of international law.9
Switzerland had, in its principal submission, invoked the Washington
Accord and had argued that Interhandel's assets in the United States
were covered by the provision that the United States "will unblock
Swiss assets." On the other hand, the United States had contended
that .the Accord related to German property in Switzerland and the
just-mentioned provision for unblocking was "of no relevance whatever
in the present dispute." The Court, finding the parties in disagreement
with regard to the meaning of the term "unblock" and the term "Swiss
assets," said:
The interpretation of these terms is a question of international law which
affects the merits of the dispute. At the present stage of the proceedings it
is sufficient for the Court to note that Article IV1 of the Washington Ac-
cord may be of relevance for the solution of the present dispute and that its
interpretation relates to international law. (P. 24.)
Indeed, the "whole question" was "whether the assets of Interhandel"
were enemy or neutral property:
'The Washington Accord, supra.note 3, an executive agreement the parties to which
are Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
'The Court based its holding upon the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice concerning Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco,
P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4, at 7 (1923). This opinion was in response to a request by
the Council of the League of Nations in connection with a comparable dispute between
the United Kingdom and France. Appreciation of the divergent views, the Permanent
Court found, "involves, owing to the very nature of the divergence, the interpretation
of international engagements. The question therefore does not, according to inter-
fiational law, fall solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a single State."
" Relating to unblocking Swiss assets. See supra note 3.
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There having been a formal challenge based on principles of international
law by a neutral state which has adopted the cause of its national, it is not
open to the United States to say that their decision is final and not open to
challenge; despite the American character of the Company, the shares of
which are held by Interhandel, this is a matter which must be decided in the
light of the principles and rules of international law governing the relations
between belligerents and neutrals in time of war. (P. 25.)
The Court then considered the objection in the light of the alterna-
tive Swiss submission requesting it to adjudge the United States under
obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation. It noted
that the Washington Accord contained a clause providing for arbitra-
tion" and that the Swiss-United States Treaty of Arbitration and Con-
ciliation, 193 1, provided that1
2
Every dispute arising between the Contracting Parties, of whatever
nature it may be, shall, when ordinary diplomatic proceedings have failed,
be submitted to arbitration or conciliation, as the Contracting Parties may at
the time decide.
"The interpretation and application of these provisions relating to arbi-
tration and conciliation," said the Court, "involve questions of inter-
national law."
Accordingly, the Court rejected part (b) of the fourth preliminary
objection of the United States."3
Coming now to the reservation by the United States in its declara-
tion of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the World Court under article
36(2) of its Statute, of
Disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United
States of America,
the Court was confronted with what the United States accounted part
(a) or the first part of its fourth preliminary objection-
"
1Art. VI.
' Art. I, 129 L.N.T.S. 465; 47 Stat. x983. See also arts. V, VI. Both parties
except from the obligation to arbitrate matters within domestic jurisdiction, but neither
reserves the right to determine for itself whether a matter is within its domestic juris-
diction. Submission to arbitration was, however, to be effected by special agreement,
subject, in the case of the United States, to the advice and consent of the Senate. Art. VII.
"'The judges stood i4-z. Judge Kojevnikov considered that this preliminary
objection "ought not to have been rejected but, in the present case, should have been
joined to the merits if the Court had not upheld the third objection."
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that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine any issues
raised by the Swiss Application or Memorial concerning the sale or disposition
of the vested shares of General Aniline and Film Corporation 14 (includ-
ing the passing of good and clear title to any person or entity), for the reason
that such sale or disposition has been determined by the United States of
America, pursuant to paragraph (b) of the Conditions attached to this coun-
try's acceptance of this Court's jurisdiction, to be a matter essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of this country. (P. i i.)
By this, the Court understood that the United States sought the finding
that it was
without jurisdiction to entertain the Application of the Swiss Government,
for the reason that the sale or disposition by the Government of the United
States of the shares of GAF which have been vested as enemy property "has
been determined by the United States of America, pursuant to paragraph (b)
of the Conditions attached to this country's acceptance of this Court's juris-
diction, to be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of this
country." The Preliminary Objections state that: "Such declination encom-
passes all issues raised in the Swiss Application and Memorial (including issues
raised by the Swiss-United States Treaty of 1931 and the Washington Ac-
cord of 1946)," but they add: "in so far as the determination of the issues
would affect the sale or disposition of the shares." And they immediately go
on to say: "However, the determination pursuant to paragraph (b) of the
Conditions attached to this country's acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction is made only as regards the sale or disposition of the assets."
During the oral arguments, the Agent for the United States continued
to maintain that the scope of part (a) of the Fourth Objection was limited
to the sale and disposition of the shares. At the same time, while insisting
that local remedies were once more available to Interhandel and that, pending
the final decision of the Courts of the United States, the disputed shares could
not be sold, he declared on several occasions that part (a) of the Fourth
Objection has lost practical significance, that "it has become somewhat aca-
demic," and that it is "somewhat moot."
Although the Agent for the United States maintained the Objection
throughout the oral arguments, it appears to the Court that, thus presented,
part (a) of the Fourth Objection only applies to the claim of the Swiss
Government regarding the restitution of the assets of Interhandel which
have been vested in the United States. Having regard to the decision of
the Court set out below in respect of the Third Preliminary Objection of
the United States, it appears to the Court that part (a) of the Fourth Pre-
14 The Delaware corporation shares of stocis in which, in the name of Interhandel,
had been vested under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 4o Stat. 419 (917), as
amended, 55 Stat. 838, 839-41 09g.).
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liminary Objection is without object at the present stage of the proceedings.(Pp. 25-26.)" 5
THIRD PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
Finally, the Court passed upon the United States' objection
that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine the matters
raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial, for the reason that Interhandel,
whose case Switzerland is espousing, has not exhausted the local remedies
available to it in the United States courts. (P. i i.)
This objection it considered one to the admissibility of the case for
adjudication rather than to its jurisdiction. For that reason, it deferred
its consideration until it had decided the preceding objections, all of
which related to jurisdiction alone.
On October 24, 1957, in the same month in which the Swiss appli-
cation was filed, the Court had issued an order,' 6 in response to Switzer-
land's request 17 for interim measures of protection of the shares of stock
its national claimed and which it considered to be in danger of sale by
the United States holding authorities acting under national law.'8 In-
terhandel had, in accordance with that law, brought suit in United
States national courts seeking restitution of this property, but its case
had been dismissed with prejudice, without having been heard on the
merits. 9 Effort on Interhandel's part had not, however, ceased, and on
October 14, 1957, subsequent to the institution of proceedings in the
World Court and request for interim measures, the Supreme Court had
granted a writ of certiorari.2" In June 1958, the Supreme Court re-
versed the action of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case."'
The case was, in March 1959, and still is, pending in the United States
courts. Accordingly, while a tenable contention of exhaustion of local
remedies could be made when Switzerland's case was instituted in the
World Court, the situation with respect both to danger of disposal of
Interhandel's property and to the possible trial of its case on the merits
"5 The judges stood zo-5 on this finding.
1" [95T] I.C.J. Rep. 05.
" Oct. 3, 1957, under art. 41 of the Statute and art. 61 of the Rules of the Court.
See also art. 6z of the Rules. For the text of the Rules see, [195o-i951] I.C.J. Y.B.
235. They were adopted May 6, 1946, and have not since been changed, [1958-1959]
id. at 34.
S-upra note 14.
10 Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Conmerciales S. A. v.
Brownell, '243 F.zd z54 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
20355 U.S. 812 (-957).
21357 U.S. 197 (958).
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in United States courts immediately changed. The World Court, hav-
ing been assured that the United States was not taking action "to fix
a time schedule for the sale" of the shares of stock, and understanding
that such sale could be effected only after the termination of judicial
proceedings pending in United States courts, found as of October 24,
1957, that there was "no need to indicate interim measures of pro-
tection." 2
In the light of the foregoing developments, the Court in its judg-
ment of March 21, 1959, found little difficulty in reaching the conclu-
sion that Interhandel's local remedies had not been exhausted. It said:
The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international
proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary interna-
tional law; the rule has been generally observed in cases in which a State
has adopted the cause of its national whose rights are claimed to have been
disregarded in another State in violation of international law. Before resort
may be had to an international court in such a situation, it has been considered
necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an oppor-
tunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own
domestic legal system. A fortiori the rule must be observed when domestic
proceedings are pending, as in the case of Interhandel, and when the two
actions, that of the Swiss company in the United States courts and that of the
Swiss Government in this Court, in its principal Submission, are designed to
obtain the same result: the restitution of the assets of Interhandel vested in
the United States. (P. 27.)
It had also been contended by the Swiss Government, the Court went
on to say,
that in the proceedings based upon the Trading with the Enemy Act, the
United States courts are not in a position to adjudicate in accordance with
the rules of international law and that the Supreme Court, in its decision of
June 16th, 1958, made no reference to the many questions of international
law which, in the opinion of the Swiss Government, constitute the subject
of the present dispute. But the decisions of the United States courts bear
witness to the fact that United States courts are competent to apply inter-
national law in their decisions when necessary. In the present case, when
the dispute was brought to this Court, the proceedings in the United States
courts had not reached the merits, in which considerations of international
law could have been profitably relied upon. (P. 28.)
In conclusion,
22 Several of the Judges made separate or dissenting statements.
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The Court considers that one interest, and one alone, that of Interhandel,
which has led the latter to institute and to resume proceedings before the
United States courts, has induced the Swiss Government to institute inter-
national proceedings. This interest is the basis for the present claim and
should determine the scope of the action brought before the Court by the
Swiss Government in its alternative form as well as in its principal form.
On the other hand, the grounds on which the rule of exhaustion of local
remedies is based are the same, whether in the case of an international court,
arbitral tribunal, or conciliation commission. In these circumstances, the
Court considers that any distinction so far as the rule of the exhaustion of
local remedies is concerned between the various claims or between the various
tribunals is unfounded. (P. 29.)23
Accordingly, the Court upheld the third preliminary objection of
the United States so far as the principal and alternative submissions of
the Swiss Government were concerned.
A number of the members of the Court appended separate state-
ments or opinions, concurring or dissenting.24 In his dissent, the Presi-
dent of the Court, Judge Klaestad, dealt with, among other aspects of
the case, the United States reservation of decision by itself whether
any given question was one of domestic jurisdiction. Various considera-
tions led him to the conclusion
that the Court, both by its Statute and by the Charter, is prevented from
acting upon that part of the Reservation which is in conflict with Article 36,
paragraph 6, of the Statute, 25 but that this circumstance does not necessarily
imply that it is impossible for the Court to give effect to the other parts of the
Declaration of Acceptance which are in conformity with the Statute. (P. 78).
In reaching the opinion that the self-judging portion of the United
States reservation could be disregarded by the Court without considering
invalid as a whole the United States declaration of acceptance of juris-
diction under article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, Judge Klaestad
was influenced by the following considerations, among others:
It appears from the debate in the United States Senate concerning the
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, reported in the Con-
gressional Record for July 31St and August ist and 2nd, 1946, that fear was
28 The judges, on this point, stood 9-6.
Judges Basdevant and Kojevnikov and Judge ad hoc Carry made brief statements.
Judges Hackworth (with whom concurred Vice-President Zafrulla Khan) C6rdova, Koo,
and Spender rendered separate opinions. President Klaestad and judges Winiarski,
Armand-Ugon, Lauterpacht, and Spiropoulos rendered dissenting opinions.
" "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be determined by the decision of the Court."
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expressed lest the Court might assume jurisdiction in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, particularly
in matters of immigration and the regulation of tariffs and duties and similar
matters. The navigation of the Panama Canal was also referred to. Such
were the considerations underlying the acceptance of Reservation (b). It
may be doubted whether the Senate was fully aware of the possibility that
this Reservation might entail the nullity of the whole Declaration of Accept-
ance, leaving the United States in the same legal situation with regard to the
Court as States which have filed no such Declarations. Would the Senate
have accepted this Reservation if it had been thought that the United States
would thereby place themselves in such a situation, taking back by means of
the Reservation what was otherwise given by the acceptance of the Declara-
tion? The debate in the Senate does not appear to afford sufficient ground
for such a supposition.
For my part, I am satisfied that it was the true intention of the competent
authorities of the United States to issue a real and effective Declaration
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, though-it is true-
with far-reaching exceptions. That this view is not unfounded appears to
be shown by the subsequent attitude of the United States Government.
By various Applications filed in the Registry of the Court on March
3 rd, 1954, March 29 th, 1955, June 2nd, 1955, and August 22nd, 1958,
the Government of the United States submitted claims against Governments
which had not filed any Declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. In previous
notes to these Governments the United States Government had invited them
to file such Declarations of Acceptance. It is difficult to believe that other
Governments would have been invited to do so if the Government of the
United States had not itself had the true intention of submitting validly and
effectively to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. (Pp. 77-78.)2 6
" See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Guerrero in the Case of Certain Nor-
wegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9, 67. In that case, Judge Lauterpacht wrote a
very comprehensive separate opinion taking the position that a declaration of acceptance
containing a reservation regarding jurisdiction as determined by itself is not a legal act
of which the Court can take cognizance and, accordingly, that such a declaration as a
whole is void and without effect. Id. at 34. Judge Lauterpacht takes substantially the
same position in the Interhandel Case.
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